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Employees Beware: How SB 43 Takes 




SB 43 passed through the Missouri Legislature and was signed into law by 
Governor Eric Greitens on June 30, 2017. Ostensibly intended to bring 
Missouri’s anti-discrimination law in line with analogous federal law, SB 
43 amended the Missouri Human Rights Act and thereby improperly in-
creased the legal burden on employment discrimination plaintiffs. This ar-
ticle examines the causation standards under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 and the Americans with Disabilities Act and contrasts those 
with the newly-amended Missouri Human Rights Act to demonstrate just 
how far Missouri law has gone. In so doing, this article ultimately con-
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 7, 2017, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People (“NAACP”) issued an unprecedented travel advisory for Missouri, warning 
citizens of the “looming danger” they face if spending time in, or traveling to the 
state.1 The danger mentioned in the advisory stems from a variety of occurrences, 
including the recent racially-charged conflict at the University of Missouri and the 
fact that African Americans are 75% more likely than whites to be pulled over by 
police in the state.2 The issue that ultimately precipitated the travel advisory, how-
ever, was the passage of Missouri Senate Bill 43 (“SB 43”).3 SB 43, dubbed a Jim 
Crow-style law by the NAACP,4 significantly increases the burden of proof for 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases under the Missouri Human Rights 
Act (“MHRA”) and makes it much more difficult for their claims to survive sum-
mary judgment.5 
Prior to the passage of SB 43, the MHRA was harshly criticized as being too 
lenient on plaintiffs, and unfair to employers.6 As such, supporters of the SB 43 
insist that it provides necessary protection for businesses, and brings Missouri law 
in line with the legal standards under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Ti-
tle VII”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).7 However, the new 
standard has taken Missouri law far beyond the federal standards identified by the 
Missouri legislature as the inspiration for their revision of Missouri employment 
discrimination law. A careful reading of state and federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes reveals stark differences in language and interpretation between the current 
iteration of the MHRA and comparable federal laws, indicating an imbalance in the 
legal protections Missouri now provides to employers versus employees. Therefore, 
this article asserts that SB 43 has unjustly biased Missouri employment discrimina-
tion law in favor of employers, and in so doing has essentially legalized employ-
ment discrimination in Missouri. 
                                                          
* B.A. in Political Science and Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Kansas, 2016. J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2019. Associate Member, Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law 
Review, 2017-2018. Special thanks to Brandon Gibson and Professor Chuck Henson for their guidance 
and encouragement throughout this process. 
1.Nancy Coleman, NAACP issues its first statewide travel advisory, for Missouri, CNN (Aug. 3, 2017, 
2:11 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/02/us/naacp-missouri-travel-advisory-trnd/index.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Ray Sanchez, Here’s why the NAACP says Missouri is unsafe for minorities, CNN (Aug. 6, 2017, 
4:24 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/06/us/missouri-naacp-travel-advisory/index.html; see S. 43, 
99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 4. Travel Advisory for the State of Missouri, NAT’L ASS’N FOR ADVANCEMENT COLORED PEOPLE 
(Aug. 2, 2017), http://www.naacp.org/latest/travel-advisory-state-missouri/. 
 5. Chris Tillery, Employer friendly changes to Missouri employment laws: what you should know, 
SEIGFREID BINGHAM, P.C., http://sb-kc.com/news/2017/05/changes-in-employer-friendly-laws-what-
you-should-know/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018) (noting that the MHRA is Missouri’s primary anti-dis-
crimination statute); see MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2017). 
 6. Tillery, supra note 5 (noting that liability attaches under the Missouri standard if the protected 
class contributed even to the adverse employment decision even 1%); Amanda Stogsdill, Discrimination 
after Daugherty: Are Missouri Courts “Contributing To” or “Motivated By” the Number of Cases on 
the Discrimination Docket?, 73 MO. L. REV. 651, 651–52 (2008). 
 7. Rick Montgomery, Greitens signs bill that raises standards for fired employees to win discrimi-
nation cases, KAN. CITY STAR (June 30, 2017, 6:56 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-gov-
ernment/article159183319.html. 
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To reach these points, section II of this article will begin by outlining the vari-
ous causation standards in employment discrimination law. Section III of this article 
will then explain the nuances of language and interpretation standards under Title 
VII and the ADA by laying out the statutes and relevant federal case law. Next, 
Missouri courts’ interpretation of the MHRA standard before and after SB 43 will 
be examined and compared to analogous federal law to demonstrate how far out of 
balance Missouri law has gone. Finally, this article will conclude by recommending 
that the “determinative influence” language added by SB 43 be struck from the 
MHRA and replaced with more equitable language in order to serve the interests of 
both employee-plaintiffs and employer-defendants. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under Title VII, the ADA, and the MHRA, employment discrimination occurs 
when an employer makes an adverse employment decision based on an individual’s 
membership in a prescribed protected class.8 Possible adverse employment deci-
sions include (but are not limited to) failure to hire, discrimination related to com-
pensation or terms of employment, or deprivation of employment opportunities.9 In 
order to make a submissible case of employment discrimination under any statute, 
a plaintiff must show there was a causal connection between his or her membership 
in a protected class and the adverse employment decision.10 
Differing judicial interpretations of the causation requirement have led to a 
spectrum of standards that employment discrimination plaintiffs must meet under 
the various anti-discrimination statutes.11 At one end of the spectrum is the most 
plaintiff-friendly standard, known as the “contributing factor” standard.12 To sur-
vive summary judgment in a contributing factor jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show 
(1) that he or she is a member of a protected class and (2) membership in that pro-
tected class contributed to the decision to terminate his or her employment.13 Under 
this standard, liability attaches when the discriminatory factor contributed to the 
adverse employment decision in any way (e.g., even 1%).14 
The middle ground of the spectrum, and the most commonly used, is known as 
the “motivating factor” standard.15 Generally speaking, employment discrimination 
plaintiffs in a motivating factor jurisdiction must show (1) that he or she is a member 
of a protected class and (2) membership in that protected class was a motivating 
factor in the adverse employment decision, even if other factors also motivated the 
decision.16 Thus, under the motivating factor standard, the discriminatory factor 
must do more than simply contribute to the decision, but need not have a determi-
native influence. 
                                                          
 8. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12111 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055. 
 9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12111; MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055. 
 10. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12111; MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055. 
 11. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12111; MO. REV. STAT. § 213.055. 
 12. Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 663–64. 
 13. Id.; MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.); 
Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 14. Tillery, supra note 5. 
 15. Note: As will be discussed in detail below, this is the standard used by Title VII, the ADA, and 
pre-Daugherty MHRA. 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
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The third, and least plaintiff-friendly standard is known either as the “determinative 
influence” or the “but-for causation” standard. Under the determinative influence 
standard, the plaintiff must show (1) that he or she is a member of a protected class 
and (2) the adverse employment decision would not have been made without con-
sideration of his or her protected class.17 In other words, the plaintiff must prove 
that the employer would not have made the adverse employment decision in the 
absence of discrimination. At this point, a visual representation of the standards 




As will be discussed in detail below, Title VII and the ADA both sit in the 
middle of this spectrum by requiring that discrimination be a motivating factor in 
the adverse employment decision, but do not require the plaintiff’s protected class 
to have a determinative influence.18 On the other hand, for several years prior to the 
passage of SB 43, Missouri adhered to the contributing factor standard (the most 
plaintiff-friendly standard).19 That standard made Missouri an outlier when com-
pared to similar state and federal laws, and was criticized for protecting employees 
at the expense of employers.20 Concern for business interests prompted legislative 
action — ultimately culminating in the passage of SB 43 and the elimination of the 
contributing factor test from the MHRA.21 
However, despite ostensibly attempting to bring the state law in line with fed-
eral standards, Missouri lawmakers completely skipped the motivating factor stand-
ard, and instead opted to include determinative influence language in SB 43.22 In 
other words, the new MHRA standard requires a plaintiff to prove that his or her 
protected class was the determining reason for the employer’s adverse decision.23 
Thus, the MHRA went from one end of the spectrum (contributing factor) to the 
other (determinative influence), without consideration of the middle ground. As 
such, the MHRA is now severely biased in favor of employers and has maintained 
Missouri’s status as an outlier in employment discrimination law. 
                                                          
 17. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. § 11.41 (2017), available at http://www.juryinstruc-
tions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Manual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc-
tions.pdf. 
 18. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 12111. 
 19. See Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007); Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 
651–52. 
 20. Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 651–52. 
 21. MO. COMM. ON SMALL BUS. AND INDUS., SB 43 CURRENT BILL SUMMARY, No. 0524S.07T 
(2017). 
 22. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2017). 
 23. Tillery, supra note 5. 
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In order to understand just how unjust Missouri law has become, consider a 
hypothetical. Employee is referred to Employer for discipline. It is Employee’s sec-
ond disciplinary infraction, and Employee is black. Employer takes both the policy 
violation and the Employee’s race into account in his decision to fire Employee. 
Under the contributing factor standard, Employer would be liable for discrim-
ination because Employee’s race contributed to its adverse employment decision. 
Similarly, Employer would likely be held liable for employment discrimination un-
der the motivating factor standard, since Employee’s race was a motivating factor 
in the adverse employment decision, even though a non-discriminatory factor also 
motivated the decision. 
However, under the determinative influence standard created by SB 43, it 
would be legal for Employer to base its employment decision in part on Employee’s 
race. Since Employer could have legally fired Employee for his infractions, Em-
ployer can claim that race did not have a determinative influence on the decision, 
despite it being one of the main considerations. Therefore, under the SB 43 stand-
ard, it is now legal for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of 
protected characteristics, so long as the discriminatory factor was not determinative. 
Thus, SB 43 has essentially legalized employment discrimination under the MHRA. 
III.  STATE LAW VS. FEDERAL LAW: WHY DOES THIS MATTER? 
When comparing state and federal law, a concern often arises that renders the 
discussion moot: if the state law is unattractive, plaintiffs may simply bring their 
claims under federal law instead.24 This conclusion is especially true in the realm 
of anti-discrimination law, as the process for bringing an employment discrimina-
tion action is nearly identical under both federal law and Missouri law.25 However, 
there are a few key distinctions that warrant further discussion. 
By definition, Title VII and the ADA only allow discrimination claims to be 
brought against employers with 15 or more employees.26 On the other hand, the 
MHRA allows victims of discrimination to bring claims against employers with at 
least six employees.27 Likewise, under Missouri law, a plaintiff has two years from 
the date of discrimination to file in state court,28 while federal law only gives plain-
tiffs 180 days from the date of discrimination to file.29 Additionally, Title VII does 
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of an individual’s ancestry.30 The MHRA, 
                                                          
 24. See generally Aryeh S. Pornoy, Katherin J. Nesbitt, & Beth I. Goldman, Forum Selection and 
Forum Non Conveniens: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, CROWELL & MORING LLP, https://www.crow-
ell.com/documents/Forum-Selection-and-Forum-Non-Conveniens-A-Plaintiffs-Perspective.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2017) (noting that plaintiffs can select the forum in which to litigate, but should consider 
a variety of factors first). 
 25. Employment discrimination plaintiffs bringing a claim under the MHRA or Title VII both must 
file an administrative claim first. Then, after a statutorily specified amount of time, plaintiffs may file a 
civil suit in the appropriate court. However, it is worth noting that state courts have concurrent jurisdic-
tion over ADA claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2018); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 213.075, 213.111. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 12111. 
 27. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010. 
 28. Notice of Right to Sue, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUST. REL., https://labor.mo.gov/mohuman-
rights/File_Complaint/right_to_sue#time (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 29. Time Limits for Filing a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2018). 
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
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on the other hand, includes ancestry as a protected classification.31 Thus, SB 43’s 
relegation of employment discrimination plaintiffs to only federal law entirely elim-
inates a cause of action previously available to those discriminated against by an 
employer with less than 15 employees and individuals discriminated against due to 
their ancestry, and gives those remaining plaintiffs less than one-quarter of the time 
to file that they would have under Missouri law. 
Furthermore, even for plaintiffs whose cause of action remains covered by Title 
VII and the ADA, bringing a federal employment discrimination claim is a daunting 
task. For example, in a study of federal civil cases from 1970 through 2006, federal 
employment discrimination plaintiffs won only 19.26% of the time, while all other 
plaintiffs won 45.53% of their cases.32 According to the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”), only about 15% of federally-based employment dis-
crimination complaints filed with the EEOC resulted in any form of relief for plain-
tiffs.33 Additionally, even when federal employment discrimination plaintiffs do 
garner relief in court, their victories are significantly more likely to be reversed than 
defense victories.34 
All of these factors combine to drive employment discrimination plaintiffs back 
to state courts and state causes of action,35 which SB 43 has now severely limited 
in Missouri. Thus, as is shown below, it is necessary to contrast Missouri law with 
federal law to determine exactly where Missouri has gone astray, and to ultimately 
suggest changes that provide a better legal balance in Missouri. 
IV.  “A MOTIVATING FACTOR” STANDARD UNDER TITLE VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal statute that bars employers 
from discriminating against employees based on the employee’s membership in a 
protected class.36 The first important difference between Title VII and SB 43 lies in 
the language of Title VII itself. In order to prevail on a claim under § 2000e-2, a 
plaintiff must show that “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivat-
ing factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated 
the practice.”37 Federal courts have interpreted this standard as significantly less 
demanding than the determinative influence standard promulgated by the SB 43 
language.38 
                                                          
 31. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010. 
 32. Id. at n. 3 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 105–06 (2009)). 
 33. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 
558 (2001). 
 34. Hon. Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspec-
tive, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671 (2012–2013). 
 35. Id. at 672 (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs 
in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 104 (2009)). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018) (protected classes are “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
 37. Id. § 2000e-2(m) (emphasis added). 
 38. See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933–35 (3rd Cir. 1997) (distinguishing between a 
“motivating factor” standard for Title VII discrimination claims and a “determinative effect” standard 
for Title VII retaliation claims); Rawlinson v. Whitney Nat’l Bank, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268 (M.D. 
Ala. 2005) (holding that “[P]laintiff need only show that race was ‘a’ motivating factor; the plaintiff 
need not show that race was ‘the’ motivating factor.”); Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 848 (9th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that “[I]f the employee succeeds in proving only that a protected characteristic was 
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Jury instructions are excellent examples of how this standard is applied in prac-
tice. Generally, jury instructions help juries determine “how to find facts on the 
basis of the evidence presented, and how to apply the law to those facts in order to 
arrive at a verdict.”39 The most pertinent jury instructions are those given at the end 
of the trial, in which the judge informs the jury about applicable law, legal defini-
tions, and appropriate methods to make factual determinations.40 
The Eighth Circuit (the federal circuit in which Missouri sits), provides clear 
jury instructions for Title VII cases. Eighth Circuit Civil Jury Instruction 5.21 is an 
excellent example of how the motivating factor standard is applied under Title 
VII.41 As defined in that instruction, the plaintiff’s protected classification is con-
sidered a motivating factor when it “played a part [or] a role”42 in the employer’s 
adverse decision, but does not have to be the only reason for the decision.43 Addi-
tionally, in disparate treatment cases,44 jurors are instructed to find for the plaintiff 
if (1) the defendant made an adverse employment decision regarding plaintiff and 
(2) the plaintiff’s protected trait played a part in the decision.45 Furthermore, the 
Eighth Circuit instructions formally differentiate between a determinative influence 
standard and the motivating factor standard used generally.46 Overall, Eighth Cir-
cuit jury instructions indicate that liability generally attaches under a federal “mo-
tivating factor” standard when discrimination played into the adverse employment 
decision, but was not determinative.47 
Furthermore, since 1991, Title VII holds an employer at least partially liable 
for discrimination even when it can prove that it would have made the same adverse 
employment decision in the absence of the discriminatory factor.48 Prior to 1991, 
the “motivating factor” standard had its basis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.49 In 
Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court crafted an exceedingly flexible notion of the 
                                                          
one of several factors motivating the employment action, an employer cannot avoid liability altogether . 
. . .”). 
 39. Christopher A. Young, In Search of Consistency: Jury Instructions Under Rule 51 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 83 IOWA L. REV. 471, 474 (1998). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. § 5.21 (2017), available at http://www.juryinstruc-
tions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Manual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc-
tions.pdf. 
 42. A note to this instruction cites to Hazen Paper Co. v. Baggins for the proposition that the protected 
trait must have had a determinative influence on the employer’s decision. Hazen Paper Co. v. Baggins, 
507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). However, this is a misleading interpretation since Hazen is an age discrimi-
nation case under the ADEA, not a Title VII case. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. § 5.21 (2017), available 
at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Man-
ual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf. 
 43. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. § 5.21 (2017), available at http://www.juryinstruc-
tions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Manual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc-
tions.pdf. 
 44. “Disparate treatment” includes discharge, failure to hire, failure to promote, and/or demotion. See 
id. § 5.40. 
 45. It is important to note that the Committee uses “played a part” and “motivating factor” inter-
changeably. Id. (emphasis added). 
 46. Id. (noting that a “determining factor” standard is only appropriate in pretext cases with indirect 
evidence). 
 47. See generally id. 
 48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
 49. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). 
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term “motivating factor,” defining it as any factor that “played a part in the employ-
ment decision.”50 On the other hand, the Court held that “when a plaintiff in a Title 
VII case proves that her [protected characteristic] played a motivating part in an 
employment decision,” the defendant-employer can still escape liability by showing 
that it would have made the same decision even without considering the protected 
characteristic.51 In other words, Price Waterhouse established a causation standard 
that required the discriminatory basis to have a determinative impact on the em-
ployment decision in order for liability to attach.52 
In response to Price Waterhouse, Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to in-
clude (1) new motivating factor language and (2) a specific instruction that a court 
may grant limited relief where a defendant showed that it would have made the 
same decision in the absence of the discriminatory factor.53 This amendment codi-
fied the flexible “motivating factor” definition set out in Price Waterhouse by indi-
cating that the discriminatory basis must be only one of many motivating factors in 
order to be an impermissible employment action.54 However, Congress also par-
tially superseded Price Waterhouse by explicitly indicating that membership in a 
protected class need not be a determinative factor in the employment decision in 
order for liability to attach.55 As a result, the motivating factor standard no longer 
necessitates a showing of determinative influence under Title VII.56 Thus, although 
allegedly inciting the passage of SB 43, Title VII purposefully avoids imposing a 
determinative influence standard like the one now contained by the MHRA. 
V.  “ON THE BASIS OF” STANDARD UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
The ADA is another federal anti-discrimination law cited by Missouri lawmak-
ers as the inspiration behind SB 43.57 The current language of the ADA makes it 
illegal to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability . . . 
.”58 An individual is considered to have a disability when, among other things, he 
or she has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities.”59 Generally, the requisite standard under the ADA is analo-
gous to the motivating factor standard in Title VII.60 As such, the ADA standard 
                                                          
 50. Id. at 241. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (limiting plaintiff’s relief under these circumstances 
to declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs). 
 54. § 2000e-2(m). 
 55. Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 850–51 (9th Cir. 2002) 
 56. Note: Title VII retaliation claims still require a determinative, but-for causation standard. How-
ever, retaliation claims are not at issue in this article. 
 57. Montgomery, supra note 7. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). 
 59. Id. § 12102(1)(A). For the definition of “major life activities,” see § 12102(2). For guidance re-
garding what “substantially limits” means, see Fact Sheet on the EEOC’s Final Regulations Implement-
ing the ADAAA, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/regula-
tions/adaaa_fact_sheet.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited Apr. 21, 2018). 
 60. See Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp. Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995); Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 
513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999); Katz v. 
City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 
209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Head v. 
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entitles an employee to some measure of relief “if he or she proves that his or her 
disability was a ‘motivating factor’ in the decision, ‘even though other factors also 
motivated’ the employer’s decision.”61 
A.  Confusion After Gross Decision 
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down a decision in Gross v. FBL Fi-
nancial Services that cast a shadow of uncertainty on the causation standard under 
the ADA.62 In Gross, the plaintiff-employee sued his former employer under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) for allegedly demoting 
him due to his age (54 years old).63 The trial court and the Eighth Circuit both ap-
plied a motivating factor standard in finding for the defendant, which the plaintiff 
appealed to the Supreme Court.64 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the statutory language (specifically the 
words “because of”) indicated that the ADEA mandates but-for causation.65 In a 
nutshell, but-for causation requires plaintiff to show that the adverse employment 
decision would not have been made but for the plaintiff’s age.66 Although this case 
interpreted the ADEA, not the ADA, the two acts are so similar that the Gross hold-
ing casts some doubt on the correct standard under the ADA.67 
B.  ADA Standard Remains Analogous to Title VII “Motivating 
Factor” 
Despite confusion from Gross, many federal courts have retained their use of 
the Title VII motivating factor standard for ADA claims in conjunction with the 
Act’s broad intent. For example, §§ 9.40 (Actual Disability), 9.41 (Perceived Disa-
bility), and 9.43 (Constructive Discharge) of the Eighth Circuit Civil Jury Instruc-
tions recommend giving juries in ADA cases the exact motivating factor instruction 
                                                          
Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005); Seam Park, Curing Causation: Justifying a “Motivat-
ing-Factor” Standard Under the ADA, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.  REV. 257, 258 (2004). 
 61. Pedigo, 60 F.3d at 1301 (quoting Title VII language to explain analogous ADA liability standard). 
 62. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 63. Id. at 170. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 173–77 (explaining that but-for causation requires a showing that the adverse employment 
decision would not have been made if the plaintiff’s age had not been considered). 
 66. Id. It is important to note that a but-for causation requirement is a much more stringent standard 
than “motivating factor.” While it is not as difficult for plaintiffs to meet as a “sole factor” standard, but-
for causation by definition requires the discrimination to have a determinative influence on the adverse 
employment decision. 
 67. See generally Michael C. Subit, One Year and Counting: How Wide an Impact has Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services Inc. Had on the Appellate Courts?, AM. B. ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/am/subit.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 
2018).. 
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given for Title VII actions.68 Furthermore, the notes for each of those sections di-
rectly cite Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transportation Inc.69 for the proposition that “‘moti-
vating factor’ is the proper phrase to use in the [ADA] instruction[s].”70 
The legislative history surrounding the ADA and Title VII also indicates that 
the Title VII motivating factor standard is proper in ADA cases. First, Congress’s 
codification of motivating factor language in Title VII was a direct response to the 
Supreme Court’s Title VII analysis in Price Waterhouse.71 That explicit and dis-
crete reaction does not indicate an intentional omission of similar language in other 
discrimination statutes (e.g., the ADA).72 In fact, the Court previously held that 
Congress’s failure to amend similar anti-discrimination statues when it amended 
Title VII indicated that pre-1991 statutory interpretations of other statutes (includ-
ing the ADA) still control.73 Thus, the ADA’s traditional use of the Title VII moti-
vating factor standard continues today.74 
Furthermore, the ADA is considered the legislative “progeny” of Title VII.75 
This designation is due in large part to the fact that, when it enacted the ADA, Con-
gress indicated that the ADA should be “interpreted in a manner consistent with . . 
. Title VII.”76 Specifically, Congress instructed that “mixed motive cases involving 
disability under the ADA should be interpreted consistent with . . . [§] 5 of this 
Act.”77 Section 5 states that “an unlawful employment practice is established when” 
a plaintiff shows that his or her protected trait played a role in the decision, even if 
the trait was not determinative.78 Therefore, Congress demonstrated a clear intent 
for the ADA liability standard to be identical to the motivating factor standard found 
within Title VII. 
                                                          
 68. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. §§ 9.40, 9.41, 9.43, 5.21 (2017), available at http://www.juryinstruc-
tions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Manual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc-
tions.pdf. 
 69. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp. Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 70. 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. §§ 9.40, 9.41, 9.43 (2017), available at http://www.juryinstruc-
tions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Manual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instruc-
tions.pdf. Unlike jury instructions in other circuits, no mention of Gross is made. 
 71. Gross, 557 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989). 
 72. Gross, 557 U.S. at 185 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005)). 
 74. See e.g., Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Pedigo, 60 F.3d 1300; Foster 
v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26, 33 
(1st Cir. 1996); Tyndall v. Nat’l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 214 (4th Cir. 1994); Parker 
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th 
Cir. 2005); See also Park, supra note 60, at 258. 
 75. Robert D. Dinerstein, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Progeny of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, AM. B. ASS’N: HUM. RTS. (2004), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publica-
tions/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol31_2004/summer2004/irr_hr_summer04_disa-
ble.html. 
 76. Park, supra note 60, at 269 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97). 
 77. Id. at 270. See Adeleke v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, No. 11-10987, 2012 WL 3655341, at *902 
(5th Cir. Aug. 27, 2012); 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. §§ 9.40, 9.41, 9.43, 5.21 (2017), available at 
http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Man-
ual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf. 
 78. Park, supra note 60, at 270 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 16–17 (1991), as reprinted in 
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 696–97). 
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Although Gross caused mild confusion, the ADA’s “on the basis of” standard 
remains identical to Title VII’s motivating factor standard due to (1) its interpreta-
tion by federal circuits79 and (2) its clear legislative history.80 Consequently, much 
like Title VII, the ADA does not require a plaintiff’s disability to have a determina-
tive influence on the adverse employment decision in order for liability to attach. 
Therefore, despite being cited as a key inspiration for SB 43,81 the ADA stops far 
short of the determinative influence standard required under the MHRA. 
VI.  MISSOURI EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW UNDER THE MHRA 
The MHRA is a Missouri statute that prevents discrimination in housing, em-
ployment, and places of public accommodations “based on race, color, religion, na-
tional origin, ancestry, sex, disability, age (in employment only), and familial status 
(in housing only).”82 The MHRA became law in 1961, with the intent of providing 
employees with a cause of action for workplace discrimination.83 Accordingly, in 
2003 two Supreme Court of Missouri cases paved the way for the adoption of the 
“contributing factor” standard established in Daugherty v. City of Maryland 
Heights.84 First, in State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that plaintiffs are entitled to a jury trial under the MHRA.85 Second, in 2005, 
Missouri adopted a new pattern jury instruction for MHRA claims (Instruction 
31.24).86 Missouri Approved Instruction 31.24 (“MAI 31.24”) indicated that 
MHRA plaintiffs should prevail if the jury finds that the protected classification 
was a contributing factor in the employment decision.87 
As a result of those two developments, the case of Daugherty v. City of Mary-
land Heights reached the Supreme Court of Missouri in 2007.88 In its holding, the 
court severed the relationship between Missouri law and Title VII, and instead held 
that the appropriate MHRA standard was the one created by Missouri Approved 
Instruction 31.24 — essentially a contributing factor standard.89 Daugherty specif-
                                                          
 79. See Adeleke, 2012 WL 3655341, at *902; 8TH CIR. CIVIL JURY INSTR. §§ 9.40, 9.41, 9.43, 5.21 
(2017), available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/8th%20Circuit%20Man-
ual%20of%20Model%20Civil%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf. 
 80. Park, supra note 60, at 270. 
 81. Montgomery, supra note 7. 
 82. Discrimination, MO. DEP’T LAB. & INDUS. REL., https://labor.mo.gov/discrimination (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2018). 
 83. Dane C. Martin, The Employees’ Decade: Recent Developments Under the MHRA and the Em-
ployers’ Potential Rebound, 75 MO. L. REV. 1349, 1350 (2010). 
 84. Chuck Henson, Title VII Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST. L. 
REV. 41, 111 (2012); see also Daugherty v. City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814 (Mo. 2007). 
 85. Henson, supra note 84, at 111; State ex rel. Diehl v. O’Malley, 95 S.W.3d 82, 92 (Mo. 2003). 
Before the decision in O’Malley, Missouri did not recognize MHRA plaintiffs’ constitutional right to a 
jury trial. 
 86. Henson, supra note 84, at 112 (citing MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 31.24 (6th ed.)). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 661; Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 814. 
 89. Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 654; Daugherty, 231 S.W.3d at 820; MO. APPROVED JURY INSTR. (Civil) 
31.24 (6th ed.). 
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ically stated that “MHRA plaintiffs need not prove ‘that discrimination was a sub-
stantial or determining factor in [a discriminatory] employment decision.’”90 Con-
sequently, Missouri courts interpreted Daugherty as requiring a contributing factor 
standard under the MHRA.91 Thus, from 2007 to 2017, an employment discrimina-
tion plaintiff simply had to show that the discriminatory factor contributed to the 
adverse employment decision at all in order to make a submissible case under the 
MHRA.92 
A.  Senate Bill 43: Intent, Circumstances, and Implications 
The Daugherty decision was almost immediately criticized by employers.93 
The contributing factor standard made Missouri an outlier, and lowered the bar for 
plaintiffs below similar federal standards.94 Employers claimed that the contributing 
factor standard was too easy for plaintiffs to meet and thus allowed even weak 
claims to make it to trial.95 When Daugherty abolished the motivating factor stand-
ard in Missouri, employers felt they “lost an important defense tool” and now bore 
an unfair burden to litigate frivolous claims.96 
In response to heavy backlash from employers (and the attorneys who represent 
them), the Missouri Legislature introduced several bills to amend the MHRA.97 
However, none of the proposed changes were successful until SB 43.98 SB 43 was 
introduced on December 1, 2016 by Senator Gary Romine.99 As introduced, SB 43 
contained “because of” and “motivating factor” language mirroring the language in 
the ADA and Title VII.100 However, when it came out of the Senate Committee on 
Small Business and Industry, SB 43’s motivating factor language had been replaced 
by a but-for causation standard.101 Specifically, the bill defined “because of” as “the 
adverse decision or action would not have been made or taken but for the em-
ployee’s protected classification.”102 
Although the but-for language was eventually abandoned in favor of the term 
“motivating factor,” the enacted version of the bill retained the intended but-for 
                                                          
 90. Walsh v. City of Kan. City, 481 S.W.3d 97, 106 n. 3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Daugherty v. 
City of Md. Heights, 231 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Mo. 2007) (noting that the MHRA may provide greater 
protection and a lower procedural standard that Title VII). 
 91. Stogsdill, supra note 6, at 651. 
 92. Id. at 654; see also Templemire v. W & M Welding, Inc., 433 S.W.3d 371, 383 (Mo. 2014); Walsh, 
481 S.W.3d at 106. 
 93. Brain P. Pezza, Anne R. Kerns & Michael Armstrong, Relief for Missouri Employers with New 
Discrimination Legislation, LEXOLOGY (May 10, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/de-
tail.aspx?g=136a44a6-43b2-4ef7-bfa2-bc9082860ab1. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Martin, supra note 83, at 1363–64 (noting that from 2009-2010 alone “three bills arose before the 
Senate and six before the House of Representatives that proposed changes to the MHRA”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (as introduced by Senate, Dec. 1, 2016); Bills Sponsored by 
Senator Romine, MO. SENATE, http://www.senate.mo.gov/17info/bts_web/sponsoredby.aspx?Session-
Type=R&legislatorid=400 (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 100. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (as introduced by Senate, Dec. 1, 2016). 
 101. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (as reported by S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Indus., Feb. 2, 
2017). 
 102. Id. (emphasis added). 
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causation standard.103 As discussed above, but-for causation means that the adverse 
employment decision would not have been made in the absence of the plaintiff’s 
protected classification.104 As amended by SB 43, the MHRA now requires the pro-
tected classification to have a determinative influence on the adverse employment 
decision.105 Since the concepts of but-for causation and determinative influence are 
used interchangeably, the MHRA now requires plaintiffs to show that the adverse 
employment decision would not have been made but for his or her protected char-
acteristic.106 Thus, the determinative influence language added to the MHRA by SB 
43 creates a but-for causation standard not seen in analogous law.107 
B.  But-For Causation and Determinative Influence are Inappro-
priate in Discrimination Cases 
SB 43’s reliance on but-for causation has made the MHRA an outlier when 
compared to Title VII and the ADA.108 But-for causation, a concept borrowed from 
tort law, was developed as a way to hold individuals liable for negligent conduct.109 
Because defendants accused of negligence did not intend to cause the harm, legal 
policy as stated in tort law protects them by requiring plaintiffs to meet the stringent 
standard of but-for causation.110 
In contrast, for intentional harm, courts are satisfied with a less substantial re-
lationship between the conduct and the harm.111 The justification behind the impo-
sition of a lighter burden in cases of intentional conduct stems from the idea that 
intentionally causing harm is morally blameworthy and thus must be protected 
against as a matter of policy.112 Because the discrimination statutes discussed in 
Sections IV, V, and VI require some level of conscious discriminatory decision-
making, employment discrimination involves intent, rather than negligence.113 As 
such, a causal relationship between the defendant’s discriminatory conduct and the 
harm to plaintiff is established as soon as the plaintiff demonstrates “the operation 
                                                          
 103. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 104. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). In other words, but for the plainff’s 
race/color/religion/national origin/ancestry/sex/age/disability, the defendant would not have taken the 
adverse employment action. 
 105. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 106. Hilde v. City of Eveleth, 777 F.3d 998, 1003–04 (8th Cir. 2015) (holding that “determinative 
influence” requirement necessarily implicates a but-for causation analysis); Wright v. Murray Guard, 
Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing various federal circuits’ interpretation of “determi-
native influence” to mean “but-for causation”); Wagner v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., No. 00-2109, 2001 
WL 967495, at *148 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001) (equating “determinative influence” with “but-for causa-
tion”); S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 107. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 108. Howard Wright, Court adopts “contributing factor” test to determine discrimination against em-
ployee for filing Workers Compensations claim, MO. PUB. POL’Y & L. (May 11, 2014), https://momunic-
ipallaw.com/2014/05/11/court-adopts-contributing-factor-test-to-determine-discrimination-against-em-
ployee-for-filing-workers-compensation-claim/. 
 109. Mark S. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy 
Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 315–20 (1982). 
 110. Id. at 313. 
 111. Id. at 315. 
 112. Id. at 315 n. 98. 
 113. See MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010 (2017); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12112(a) (2018). Note that “dispar-
ate impact” discrimination cases may include an element of negligence, but that is not at issue here. 
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of an unlawful motivating factor.”114 In contrast, negligence cases require the plain-
tiff to establish that the conduct was the determining factor (but-for factor) in caus-
ing plaintiff’s harm.115 Thus, since employment discrimination is an intentional act, 
but-for causation is an overall inappropriate standard for liability to attach in dis-
crimination cases.116 
Furthermore, the determinative influence or but-for standard enacted by SB 43 
strays far beyond what is required under Title VII and ADA, discussed in Sections 
IV and V.117 The motivating factor standard under Title VII and the ADA conforms 
with the concept of liability for intentional conduct (i.e., discrimination); liability 
attaches as soon as the plaintiff establishes the defendant’s consideration of plain-
tiff’s protected classification.118 In contrast, the MHRA now requires plaintiffs to 
establish the protected classification was the determining factor in the defendant’s 
adverse decision.119 The codification of a but-for causation standard suggests that 
the intent of Missouri lawmakers was not to bring the state’s standard in line with 
analogous federal law, but instead to heavily restrict plaintiffs’ ability to bring suc-
cessful employment discrimination claims. 
VII. CONCLUDING WITH A RECOMMENDATION 
The previous contributing factor standard for MHRA cases made Missouri an 
outlier, and tipped the scale too far in favor of employment discrimination plain-
tiffs.120 However, SB 43 has now improperly taken Missouri law beyond any anal-
ogous standard.121 Title VII and the ADA, the alleged inspirations for SB 43,122 
purposefully stop short of burdening discrimination plaintiffs with a determinative, 
but-for standard of proof.123 By adding the requirement that the unlawful factor have 
a determinative influence on the employment decision, SB 43 has created a legal 
disparity in favor of employers and essentially removed a state cause of action pre-
viously available to plaintiffs.124 
State and federal laws have long recognized that discrimination is a social ill 
that must be protected against.125 However, that protection cannot come at the ex-
pense of employers.126 Similarly, protection of business interests cannot come at the 
expense of employees’ civil rights.127 The interests of both employers and employ-
ees must be balanced in a way not achieved by either SB 43 or the contributing 
                                                          
 114. Brodin, supra note 109, at 320. 
 115. Id. at 326. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See discussion supra Parts II & III. 
 118. Brodin, supra note 109, at 320; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 12112(a); see also discussion supra 
Parts II & III. 
 119. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 120. Austin Huguelet, Missouri lawmakers continue battle over discrimination bill, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-lawmakers-
continue-battle-over-discrimination-bill/article_608d6170-ab57-5f3a-ba9b-397edd7d8c56.html (noting 
that “with the contributing factor standard’s low bar, there’s almost nothing an employer can do.”). 
 121. Montgomery, supra note 7. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12112. 
 124. S. 43, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017). 
 125. Henson, supra note 84, at 111. 
 126. Montgomery, supra note 7. 
 127. Sanchez, supra note 3. 
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factor standard. Thus, the easiest way to begin balancing these interests is to strike 
the offending language from the MHRA, namely the phrase “and had a determina-
tive influence on the adverse decision or action[.]”128 
Additionally, since federal anti-discrimination law inspired SB 43,129 Missouri 
should define motivating factor in the same way that Title VII and the Eighth Circuit 
do: discrimination played a part or a role in the adverse employment action, but 
does not have to be the only reason for the action.130 However, this proposed defi-
nition requires some additional protection against reverting to a contributing factor 
standard. As such, the MHRA’s definition of motivating factor should also include 
the requirement that the unlawful consideration be more than a remote or trivial 
factor.131 
In light of the forgoing discussion, this article proposes that the term “motivat-
ing factor” in the MHRA be defined as the following: “a factor that plays a part or 
a role in the adverse employment decision. The unlawful factor must be more than 
a remote or trivial factor but need not be the only factor or have a determinative 
influence on the decision.” Striking the determinative influence language and al-
lowing liability to attach even where non-discriminatory factors also motivated the 
decision protects employee-plaintiffs. Employer-defendants, on the other hand, are 
protected by the requirement that discrimination be more than a remote or trivial 
factor. 
One thing is clear about Missouri employment discrimination law: a change 
must be made. Policy decisions such as this require a delicate balancing act, and SB 
43 is a clumsy, insufficient solution. By allowing employers to consider a person’s 
protected characteristic in their employment decisions, SB 43 has essentially legal-
ized employment discrimination in Missouri.132 Furthermore, the change in the 
MHRA has taken Missouri law out of compliance with federal standards, costing 
the state half a million dollars in federal funding.133 However, that is just the begin-
ning of the potential consequences brought on by SB 43.134 The bill also gutted 
whistleblower protections in the MHRA, allowing employers to retaliate against 
employees who raise concerns about workplace discrimination, therefore discour-
aging victims from seeking internal administrative solutions.135 The removal of ad-
ministrative remedies is in addition to the disproportionately large legal burden now 
placed on discrimination plaintiffs by SB 43. Overall, the message sent by Missouri 
lawmakers is clear: ending employment discrimination is not a priority. SB 43 may 
be good for politics, but it is bad for Missouri. 
                                                          
 128. MO. REV. STAT. § 213.010(19) (2017). 
 129. Montgomery, supra note 7. 
 130. See supra Part IV (discussing Title VII and Eighth Circuit jury instructions). 
 131. This “remote or trivial” portion of this definition was roughly inspired by California Civil Jury 
Instructions. CACI No. 430 (2007). 
 132. See supra Part II. 
 133. Bryan Lowry, Weakening of anti-discrimination law could cost Missouri $500,000 in federal 
funds, KAN. CITY STAR (Oct. 12, 2017, 2:35 PM), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-govern-
ment/article178512716.html. 
 134. Sarah Fenske, The Dirty Little Secret of Missouri’s SB 43, RIVERFRONT TIMES (May 11, 2017, 
7:16 AM), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2017/05/11/the-dirty-little-secret-of-missouris-
sb-43-whistleblowers-would-get-screwed. 
 135. Benjamin Peters, Auditor, MATA urge Greitens to veto SB 43 over ‘Whistleblower Protection Act’, 
MO. TIMES (May 19, 2017), https://themissouritimes.com/41035/auditor-mata-urge-greitens-veto-sb-
43-whistleblower-protection-act/. 
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